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The two most commonly used types of false belief task are location change (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and unexpected contents (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987) tasks. In the "Sally-Anne" location change task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) , the child is presented with the following scenario: "Sally puts her marble in the basket. Then she goes out for a walk. While she is gone, Anne takes the marble out of the basket and puts it in the box. When Sally comes back, where will she look for her marble?" In order to correctly predict that Sally will look in the basket, the child must impute a false belief (that the marble is in the basket) to Sally. In the "Smarties" unexpected contents task (Perner et al., 1987) , the child is shown that a tube of Smarties contains pencils rather than the expected sweets, and is then asked what someone else, who has not seen inside the tube, will think is in there before it is opened. Once again, the child must invoke the notion of a false belief in order to . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 4 respond correctly. Although ToM abilities become increasingly sophisticated during the preschool years, it is not until around 4 years of age that typically developing children are able to pass false belief tasks (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 ). If individuals with ASD have impaired ToM, they should not be able to pass such tasks reliably.
Although dozens of studies indicate that, as a population, individuals with ASD have difficulty with ToM tasks, there is nonetheless a proportion of affected individuals who pass such tasks in the presence of severe social and communication impairments (e.g., Happé, 1995; Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998) .
If the core features of ASD are the result of attenuated ToM, as many researchers have maintained, then such findings must be accounted for.
One suggestion, which may preserve the integrity of the ToM hypothesis, is that individuals with ASD use compensatory, verbally-mediated, non-ToM strategies to "hack out" solutions to ToM tasks (Bowler, 1992; Happé, 1995) . If this is the case then successful ToM task performance amongst individuals with ASD does not reflect the same underlying process that operates in typically developing individuals. This proposal is consistent with a substantial amount of data showing a particularly strong relationship between language (e.g., receptive vocabulary and grammar) and ToM task performance amongst individuals with ASD (e.g., Fisher, Happé, & Dunn, 2005; Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005) .
Drawing on de Villiers' (e.g., 1995) work on typical development, TagerFlusberg (2000) has argued that a specific type of grammatical competence -the syntax of complementation -may facilitate ToM task performance in ASD. De
Villiers suggests that once a typically developing child has acquired complement syntax and understood the semantics of complementation, they have available a new . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 5 capacity for representing false beliefs. Complementation is a syntactic process, which allows one propositional argument to be embedded under another proposition. Both communication (e.g., "say", "tell") and mental state verbs (e.g., "think", "believe", "know") can take embedded sentential complements. For example:
1. "She said she was drawing a face, but it was really a scribble." 2. "Sally thought the marble was in the box, but it was really in the basket."
The semantics of complement structures mean that the embedded proposition -the complement [depicted in italics in 1 and 2 above] -can express either a true or false proposition, without affecting the truth value of the sentence as a whole. It is this property of sentential complements that is said to make them ideal for representing false beliefs. Hence, sentence 2, above, may be a true statement as a whole, despite the fact that the embedded proposition ("the marble was in the box") is false.
De Villiers and Pyers (2002) conducted a longitudinal study to examine the relation between complement syntax competence and false belief task performance in typical development. A "memory for complements" task was used to assess complement syntax competence, and location change and unexpected contents tasks were used to assess false belief understanding. The memory for complements paradigm involves presenting children with short stories containing embedded complements, which are followed by questions requiring the child to extract the complements from the sentences. For example, "She said she found a monster under her chair, but it was really the neighbour's dog. What did she say?" The researchers found that memory for complements embedded under communication verbs was significantly correlated with concurrent performance on both false belief tasks. . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 6 Longitudinally, memory for communication complements predicted false belief understanding three months later, even after controlling for mean length of utterance and grammatical complexity. False belief understanding did not predict later memory for complements. Two training studies also support the hypothesised link between complement syntax and false belief task performance (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003) .
As explained above, de Villiers argues that complement syntax provides a representational format for encoding false beliefs. However, this capacity is not tantamount to a representational ToM. Rather, it represents an important stage in ToM development that, amongst typically developing children, ultimately leads to a fully-fledged ability to reason about mental states (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002) . It is possible that some children with ASD utilise their knowledge of complement structures to facilitate their false belief test performance, without going on to develop a mature ToM. Indeed, some 15 years ago, Leslie and Roth (1993) proposed that "verbally able autistic children are eventually able to exploit the fact that verbal expressions lay out the structure of propositional attitudes…using a unique verbargument structure where the object of the verb is another sentence" (pp.103-104).
Previously, Tager-Flusberg (2000) and Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) have attempted to assess the relationship between complement syntax and ToM task performance in ASD. The results of their studies generally appear to show a positive relationship between these variables amongst children with ASD. For example, Tager-Flusberg (2000, Study 1) found that communication verb complement syntax competence significantly predicted location change false belief task performance amongst older children and adolescents with ASD, but not amongst age-and language-matched participants with mental retardation. However, concerns over . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 7 aspects of the methods used, the way these studies were reported, and the types of statistical analyses used may lead to the reliability of this relationship being questioned. Tager-Flusberg's (2000) chapter does not include details of participant characteristics and, in some cases, inappropriate statistical analyses were used (e.g., the use of multiple regression, including four predictor variables, with a sample size of only 20). More critically, the statistics reported did not assess whether the relationship between complement syntax and false belief task performance was significantly stronger within the ASD group than within the comparison group. Thus, it is still unclear whether complement syntax competence genuinely plays a special role in the false belief task performance of children with ASD, although there is some suggestive evidence that this may be so. To test this hypothesis, the current study adopted similar measures to those used by de Villiers and Pyers (2002) in their study of typically developing children. A memory for complements task was selected as the measure of complement syntax competence, and the Sally-Anne location change (Baron- Cohen et al., 1985) and Smarties . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 8 unexpected contents (Perner et al., 1987) Although all participants in the current study completed both false belief tasks, given that each task entails different cognitive demands, the results from each were considered separately, rather than as a composite. For example, whereas the SallyAnne task involves a narrative and a relatively simple test question, the Smarties task does not involve a narrative but involves a more complex test question (Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007) . In typical development, it is generally assumed that a shift to a representational ToM underlies successful false belief task performance, regardless of task-specific factors (Wellman et al., 2001) . However, in the current study, it was postulated that successful performance in ASD might not be underpinned by such a conceptual change, but rather by compensatory mechanisms.
Because it could not be assumed that compensatory strategies would be deployed equally across different false belief problems, the tasks were considered separately. . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 9
Method

Participants
Approval for this study was obtained from City University Research Ethics Committee. Participants were recruited through schools in South-East England. The parents of all participants gave informed, written consent for their children to take part in the study. Verbal ability was assessed using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997) . All participants completed the Sally-Anne and Smarties false belief tasks as well as the complement syntax task. However, the results are presented in two sections which include overlapping, but not identical, samples of participants. The analyses concerning the Sally-Anne and Smarties tasks are presented in Sections 1 and 2 of the results, respectively.
In order to assess the relationship between complement syntax and false belief task performance, it was essential to make certain that participants passed the control questions for the relevant false belief task. This ensured that any failure on the test question was due to a specific difficulty with representing false beliefs as opposed to extraneous task demands. However, a number of participants failed the control questions for one of the false belief tasks but passed the control questions for the other. It was decided that such individuals should not be excluded from analyses concerning the false belief task for which they had passed the control questions. So, for example, a child who failed the Sally-Anne control questions, but passed the Smarties control questions, would be included in the analysis of the relationship between complement syntax and Smarties task performance but excluded from the analysis of the relationship between complement syntax and Sally-Anne task performance. This strategy maximised the power of the planned statistical analyses . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 10 but meant that the participant characteristics for the Sally-Anne and Smarties samples differed somewhat.
The Sally-Anne and Smarties samples each consisted of a group of participants with ASD and an age and verbal ability matched comparison group. The participants in the ASD groups attended specialist autism schools or units, for which entry required a formal diagnosis of autistic disorder, Asperger's disorder, pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified or atypical autism (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; World Heath Organisation, 1993) . All participants in the current study met the criteria for autistic disorder or Asperger's disorder.
The comparison groups consisted of children with general learning disability Within the "Sally-Anne sample" (which was used in Section 1 of the results), the ASD group consisted of 48 children/adolescents with autistic disorder (n = 43) or
Asperger's disorder (n = 5), and the comparison group consisted of 48 children/adolescents with general learning disability (n = 26) or typical development (n = 22). In the "Smarties sample" (which was used in Section 2 of the results), the ASD group consisted of 53 children/adolescents with autistic disorder (n = 46) or Asperger's disorder (n = 7), and the comparison group consisted of 53 . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 11 children/adolescents with general learning disability (n = 27) or typical development (n = 26). The characteristics of the ASD and comparison groups in the Sally-Anne and Smarties samples, respectively, are presented in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 
Materials and Procedure
Participants completed the BPVS first, then the false belief tasks, and finally the complement syntax task. However, the order in which they completed the Sally-Anne and Smarties tasks was counterbalanced.
The complement syntax task involved the experimenter reading 8 one-line stories (e.g., "She told her husband she saw a ghost but it was really a blanket.") to the participant in a fixed order and, after each one, asking them a question (e.g., "What did she tell her husband?") which required them to extract the complement embedded within it. Each story was accompanied by two illustrative photographs.
The experimenter pointed to the relevant parts of the photographs as she read the stories aloud. Each story contained a complement embedded under a tensed communication verb (either "say" or "tell"). Communication verbs, rather than mental state verbs, were used to avoid confounding complement syntax and ToM competence. Participants' responses were recorded verbatim at the time of testing.
Appendix 1 provides details of each story.
The Sally-Anne procedure involved the experimenter acting-out the following sequence using dolls and other props, whilst describing the ongoing events: "Sally's going to put her marble in the blue box. Now Sally's going out to play. While Sally's out, naughty Anne takes the marble out of the blue box and puts it in the pink box.
When Sally comes back…" The following questions were then asked: (a) "Where will she look for her marble first?" (test question); (b) "Where is the marble really?"
(reality control question); and (c) "Where was the marble in the beginning?"
(memory control question).
For the Smarties task, the usual Smarties tube and pencils were substituted (second reality control question).
Scoring
Both the Sally-Anne and Smarties tasks were scored dichotomously as pass/fail, according to performance on the test questions. For a participant's data to be included, they were required to pass the relevant control questions. Children could . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 13 score a maximum of eight points on the complement syntax task -one point per question. For a response to be deemed correct, the participant had to extract the complement from the story. However, they were not required to repeat the complement precisely, as they had heard it. If their response captured the gist of the complement (i.e., the counterfactual state of affairs), it was coded as correct. Any mention of the final clause of the sentence (which indicated the true state of affairs) resulted in a response being coded as incorrect. This was because such responses were considered to reflect a failure to distinguish and selectively extract the complement from the complete sentence. Irrelevant (e.g., "I was OK, I hope", "Yuk!") or "don't know" responses were also coded as incorrect.
Results
Section 1: Sally-Anne and complement syntax analyses
The complement syntax scores and VMAs of Sally-Anne passers and failers, within the ASD and comparison groups, are displayed in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 about here]
The ASD and comparison groups did not differ significantly in terms of complement syntax score, U = 1088.00, z = 0.49, p = .63, r = .05, indicating that they had similar levels of complement syntax competence. A total of 26/48 (54.2%) participants with ASD passed the Sally-Anne task, compared to 40/48 (83.3%) comparison participants. The association between group and Sally-Anne task performance was correlations indicated that complement syntax was significantly associated with SallyAnne performance within the ASD group only. The bivariate correlation for the ASD group was strong and the partial correlation was moderate (Cohen, 1992) . Each of the correlations for the comparison group was weak. It was also important to establish whether complement syntax and Sally-Anne task performance were significantly more strongly related within the ASD group than within the comparison group.
Fisher's Z transformations were used to compare the coefficients for each of the groups. These analyses confirmed that both the bivariate, Z r1-r2 = 2.75, p < .01, and partial, Z r1-r2 = 3.30, p < .01, correlations were significantly stronger within the ASD group than within the comparison group.
Section 2: Smarties and complement syntax analyses
The complement syntax scores and VMAs of Smarties passers and failers, within the ASD and comparison groups, are displayed in Table 3 .
[ Table 3 about here]
The groups did not differ significantly in terms of complement syntax score, U = 1348.00, z = -0. Thus, in contrast to the results reported in Section 1, which showed complement syntax to be significantly correlated with Sally-Anne performance within the ASD group but not the comparison group, these results indicated that complement syntax was not significantly related to Smarties performance within either group after controlling for VMA and CA.
Discussion
It was hypothesised that whereas some children with ASD may use knowledge of complement syntax as a compensatory linguistic strategy to perform successfully on measures of false belief understanding in the absence of ToM competence, amongst children without ASD, successful false belief task performance reflects their accurate representation of others' false beliefs, and not a compensatory linguistic strategy.
Therefore, it was predicted that the relationship between complement syntax competence and false belief task performance would be significantly stronger within the ASD group than within the comparison group. The current data provided clear support for this prediction in relation to the Sally-Anne task but, importantly, not in relation to the Smarties task.
Correlation analyses revealed that complement syntax scores were strongly associated with Sally-Anne performance (r = .50) within the ASD group. Crucially, controlling for the effect of vocabulary only slightly weakened this relationship (r = .44), highlighting the specific association between Sally-Anne task performance and complement syntax competence. However, within the comparison group, complement syntax scores were not significantly correlated with Sally-Anne performance (r = -.03).
The current results are in close alignment with those of Tager These results, particularly in connection with those of Tager-Flusberg (2000), may suggest that knowledge of complement syntax plays a special role in the SallyAnne task performance of children with ASD, allowing them to succeed on this widely-used false belief task in the absence of false belief competence. Alternatively, as suggested by Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, and Garnham (2003) , the direction of causality could be opposite to this, with successful performance on such complement syntax tasks presupposing a theory of false belief. They suggest that "without such a theory…the child has no basis for reconstructing what was said, and . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 18 remembering a mistaken proposition" (p.141). In the memory for complements task used here, for example, the protagonists in the stories could be construed as either lying (trying to induce a false belief in another person) or holding a false belief. On this account, a memory for complements task amounts to a type of false belief task.
Although it is never possible to infer the direction of causality from a correlation between two variables, there are notable reasons to favour the hypothesis that complement syntax competence facilitates false belief task performance rather than the hypothesis that false belief competence facilitates complement syntax task performance. In the current study, the ASD group demonstrated impaired false belief understanding but unimpaired memory for complements. If the memory for complements task relied on false belief understanding, the ASD group should have been impaired on this task also. Thus, rather than relying of false belief understanding, the task appears simply to require recall and parsing of complement structures.
Findings from previous studies also support the interpretation that these results reflect the fact that knowledge of complement syntax is utilised by some children with ASD to facilitate Sally-Anne task performance. As previously discussed, longitudinal studies of typical development (e.g., de Villiers & Pyers, 2002) show that complement syntax predicts later false belief task performance amongst 3-to 5-year-olds (independent of general linguistic ability), but false belief task performance does not predict later complement syntax competence. More pertinently, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) found that this same pattern applied in a sample of 20 children with ASD 1 . Together these findings support the interpretation that complement syntax may be used as a means of passing location change false belief tasks amongst some children with ASD. . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 19
Despite the arguments presented above, it remains the case that the design of the current study was limited in terms of its ability to distinguish between competing explanations of the relationship between complement syntax competence and false belief task performance. Indeed, it will be important to follow-up these findings with longitudinal or training studies in order to firmly establish a causal model. However, the main purpose of this study was to establish whether complement syntax knowledge plays a stronger role in the false belief task performance of children with ASD than in children without ASD. In this respect, the current results are Although complement syntax may play an important ontogenetic role in the typical development of ToM, the relationship between complement syntax and false . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 20 belief task performance may not hold throughout the course of development. In this respect, complement syntax may still be said to play a special role in ASD, when considered in relation to the specific age and ability groups concerned. Thus, although the relationship per se may not be unique to ASD, the strong relationship between complement syntax and location change task performance amongst individuals with higher developmental levels does appear to be unique to ASD.
In relation to the Smarties task, there was no evidence to suggest that children with ASD were using alternative strategies to negotiate the task. These findings are incompatible with the notion that children with ASD use complement syntax as a means of hacking out a solution to the Smarties task. It is important to consider why the initial predictions were confirmed in relation to the Sally-Anne but not the Smarties false belief task. It is possible that task-specific factors make the Sally-Anne task more conducive to the implementation of compensatory strategies. The cognitive and linguistic demands of the Sally-Anne and Smarties tasks are somewhat different.
Most conspicuously, the Sally-Anne task involves a narrative and a relatively simple test question, whereas the Smarties task does not involve a narrative but involves a more complex test question. Children who have a good grasp of complement syntax may have the potential to linguistically represent a false belief, but their ability to deploy such representations may be dependent on multiple factors. Moreover, the fact that there were no group differences in complement syntax performance, but the ASD group performed significantly less well on the Sally-Anne task, demonstrates that good complement knowledge is not always sufficient to enable successful Sally-Anne task performance amongst individuals with ASD. Further research will be required to establish the reasons for the inconsistent pattern of results observed within the present study, with respect to the two false belief tasks, and to fully elucidate the relationship . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 21 between language and ToM amongst individuals with ASD. Clearly, there is much left to be explained.
To summarise, the results of this study, although not conclusive, are at least partially compatible with the hypothesis that children with ASD are more reliant than children without ASD on their linguistic knowledge of complement structures to succeed on false belief tasks. This is the first study to suggest that complement syntax may play a special role in the false belief task performance of children with ASD on at least one type of false belief task. If this interpretation is correct, it follows that successful false belief task performance amongst children with ASD may not invariably reflect a genuine representational ToM, but rather the operation of compensatory linguistic strategies. As suggested above, some children with ASD may be able to use complement syntax to represent false beliefs in certain structured test situations, without going on to develop a mature ToM. Such strategies are likely to be poorly suited to the task of attributing mental states in complex, dynamic reallife social situations. This may explain why even those individuals with ASD who reliably pass false belief tasks nevertheless demonstrate markedly diminished awareness mental states in their everyday lives. . Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder 31 
